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Some people sincerely wish to engage in high risk
pursuits, but the operation of the tort system substantially
interferes with that choice. The tort system authorizes
courts and juries, which are potentially unsympathetic to
the value of risk choice, to determine the “social
undesirability” of activities... Such interference with risk
choice will not be based on any determination that could be
considered legitimate under an autonomy-respecting
principle.
Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 Emory L.J.
1, 43. (1993).
I. Introduction
Professor Judges’ critique of the tort system’s handling of hazardous recreational
activity rang truer in 1993 than it does in 2003. Over the last decade courts throughout
the country established common law doctrine that limit the ability of plaintiffs to recover
for injuries sustained during risk-taking recreational activities. The California Supreme
Court led this movement with their decision in Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 834 P.2d
696, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 (1992). Courts in a number of other jurisdictions have adopted the
reasoning of Knight. 1 Negligence claims for sports injuries have consequently been
limited substantially.
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Knight has been cited to support limits on tort liability in sports in a number of
jurisdictions outside of California. See Cahill v. Carella, 648 A.2d 169, 172 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1994) (softball injury); Foronda v. Haw. Int'l Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 839
(Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (boxing death); Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (Ill.
1995) (informal can kicking game); Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 416-18 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (bike injury during a triathalon injury); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335,
338 (Ky. 1995) (tennis); Ritchie- Gamester v. City of Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517, 521
(Mich. 1999) (ice skating); Martin v. Buzan, 857 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
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Yet the public perception has not caught up with the judicial reality. Most people
view liability as an ever-present threat in risk taking recreational activities. The fear of
liability has prevented private and public entities from encouraging or allowing risky
recreational activities. To assuage these fears, legislatures have passed liability-limiting
statutes.2 The decisions passed down by the courts over the last ten years have made
these statutes redundant at best. At worst, these statutes offend the preferences of the
individual and the autonomy of the sport, and possibly allow a cause of action that could
not stand under the common law. Further, such statutes cause instability in the courts at a
time when favorable common law is developing. This article examines these issues in
the one “high-risk” sport with which I am intimately familiar – skateboarding. The
California liability limiting statute applied to skateboarding is unnecessary, as the
common law assumption of risk doctrine protects defendants from liability for skateboard
injuries. In fact, the statutory law may curtail the defenses available under common law.
Further, the statute impinges on the autonomy of the individual skater and furthers the
process by which skateboarding is criminalized.
Section II. provides relevant background information on skateboarding, and the
California statute that limits liability for injuries sustained in skateboard parks.

(co-ed softball game); Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962, 964 (N.J. 2001) (golf); Reddell
v. Johnson, 942 P.2d 200, 205 (Okla. 1997) (BB gun "war"); Phi Delta Theta Co. v.
Moore, 10 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. 1999) (Enoch, J., dissenting) (paint ball injury). See
also Swenson v. Sunday River Skiway Corp., 79 F.3d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying
Maine law and noting that moguls present an inherent risk in skiing).
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For example, a Florida statute limiting liability for injuries occurring from
skateboarding, inline skating or freestyle biking states, “The purpose of this section is to
encourage governmental owners or lessees of property to make land available to the
public for skateboarding, inline skating, and freestyle bicycling. It is recognized that
governmental owners or lessees of property have failed to make property available for
such activities because of the exposure to liability…” Fla. Stat. §316.0085(1) (2002).
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Section III. discusses the common law assumption of risk doctrine, and its
application to skateboarding.
Section IV. analyzes the effect of liability limiting statutes on the common law
assumption of risk doctrine; specifically, whether a statutory violation abrogates the
assumption of risk doctrine.
In conclusion, this article suggests that legislatures, as well as courts, respect the
autonomy of sports and the individual. If liability limiting statutes are thought necessary
to encourage growth of a sport such as skateboarding, such legislation should be narrowly
drafted. Narrow draftsmanship better preserves the autonomy of the sport while more
fully shielding cities that build skateparks from liability.
II. Background
Skateboarders have always skated in the streets, schools, and backyard pools. But
in the mid–90’s the number of skaters grew dramatically. Skating in these areas became
increasingly off limits. Cities passed ordinances banning skateboarding on public streets
and sidewalks. Property owners begin kicking skaters off their property, often by hiring
private security or calling in the police. The resulting confrontations between frustrated
skaters and the angry security guards or police officers were often ugly, sometimes
violent. The need for hassle-free, public places to skateboard was apparent. Public
skateparks were the obvious solution, but only a handful of public skateparks existed
during the nineties. Cities were hesitant to build skateparks, largely because of liability
concerns. The skateboard industry sought to address these concerns by urging the
California Legislature to pass a law barring recovery for skateboard injuries occurring at
a public skatepark.
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That bill, A.B. 1296, passed and became Health & Safety Code §115800 in 1998.
§115800 states in part:
(d)(1) Skateboarding at any facility or park owned or
operated by a public entity as a public skateboard park, as
provided in paragraph (3), shall be deemed a hazardous
recreational activity within the meaning of § 831.7 of the
Government Code...
§ 831.7 of the Government code provides in relevant part:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable to
any person who participates in a hazardous recreational
activity, including any person who assists the participant, or
to any spectator who knew or reasonably should have
known that the hazardous recreational activity created a
substantial risk of injury to himself or herself and was
voluntarily in the place of risk, or having the ability to do
so failed to leave, for any damage or injury to property or
persons arising out of that hazardous recreational activity.
The law served its purpose. It demonstrated that skateboarding enjoyed enough support
to get the state legislatures attention. Cities begin building skateparks. These parks were
wildly popular, with an estimated 50-100 users on any given day. As cities saw the
popularity of skateparks at neighboring cities, they came to recognize the need for
skateparks and rushed to meet these needs. §115800 was the catalyst that started this
chain reaction.
That law had other provisions as well. Health & Safety Code §115800(a) forces
cities with skateparks to adopt ordinances requiring all skaters to wear kneepads, elbow
pads and helmets in the skatepark. “No operator of a skateboard park shall permit any
person to ride a skateboard therein, unless that person is wearing a helmet, elbow pads,
and knee pads.” Health & Safety Code §115800(a). If the skatepark is not supervised on a
regular basis, the city may meet its duty by “adopting an ordinance requiring any person
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riding a skateboard at the facility to wear a helmet, elbow pads, and knee pads” and by
posting a sign giving notice of the ordinance. Health & Safety Code §115800(b)(1)(2).
The law also had a “sunset” clause, and was to automatically expire on January 1,
2003, unless the legislature voted to renew the bill.3 Health & Safety Code §115800(e).
Jim Fitzpatrick, President of the International Association of Skateboard Companies
(IASC), sent a series of emails to members of the skateboard industry urging them to
contact their representatives and express their support for the law. Fitzpatrick’s emails
threatened that all the skateparks in California could close if the law was not renewed.
He argued that the future of skateboarding was at risk. As a part owner of a small
skateboard magazine, I received these emails. I emailed a reply, agreeing that the future
of skateboarding was at risk, but was at risk precisely because of the law. I urged owners
of skateboard companies to withdraw their support from the bill that would renew the
law.
The reason I opposed the bill was the provision in the law forcing cities with
skateparks to adopt ordinances requiring the use of safety gear. Serious skateboard
related injuries are rare. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
recently surveyed fifty skateparks. The CPSC survey found that soccer players are
almost twice as likely to be injured as skateboarders, while basketball players and
baseball players are 3 and 4 times, respectively, more likely to be injured.4 Product-
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The legislature renewed §115800 when it enacted S.B. 994 in 2002. The current
version of §115800 is set to sunset on January 1, 2008. Cal Health & Safety Code
§115800(e).
4
Product-Associated Visits To Hospital Rooms report by the U.S. Consumer Products
Safety Commission. 1997
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Associated Visits To Hospital Rooms report by the U.S. Consumer Products Safety
Commission, available at http://www.skateboarding.com/skate/skate_biz/article/
0,12364,199931,00.html. Because there are so few skateboard injuries the costs to
society from such injuries are negligible. There is no governmental interest in
diminishing these already negligible costs. If there were such an interest, the same
interest would be doubly present in soccer, and four times as compelling in baseball. As
Albert Fierro, Risk Manager of Association of Bay Area Government’s Pooled Liability
Assurance states, "[Skateparks] are no more dangerous than swings and slides.
Apparently if anyone falls, they go home for treatment. They’re not suing if they get
hurt." Memorandum from the Richmond Skatepark Supporters, to the Richmond City
Counsel (Feb. 20, 2003)(on file with author).
In the absence of a valid government interest in safety, the individual participant’s
conduct should be determined by the norms of the sport and the preferences of the
individual.5 In the case of skateboarding, there is no valid interest in decreasing the
sport’s inherent dangers. Accordingly, each skater should decide for him or herself when
and where he/she wears safety gear. Kneepads and helmets are normally worn on large
halfpipes and in deep bowls. The speeds reached in these terrains are significant. If the
skater has to abandon the trick, they are skating too fast to run it out, so they make use of
the plastic surface on the pads and knee-slide out of the bailed trick. In contrast, safety
gear is not normally worn on the street or on the small obstacles found in the majority of
skateparks because safety gear does little to prevent likely injuries received on this type
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For an argument that society should place more value on the individual’s decision to
participate in high risk recreational activities, see Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard
Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 Emory L.J. 1, 43. (1993).
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of terrain. The majority of these injuries that do occur are minor breaks, torn ligaments,
etc, and would not be prevented by safety gear. Further, many skaters feel that safety
gear adversely affects the feelings of freedom and risk taking inherent in the nature of
skating.
A policy of respecting skateboarding’s autonomy was one of the reasons I
opposed Health & Safety Code §115800; another reason was because I oppose the
process by which skateboarding is criminalized under §115800. Skaters who choose not
to wear safety gear may be ticketed and even arrested under the ordinances that §115800
require cities to adopt. Yet the majority of skaters follows the norms of the sport and
chooses not to wear pads. Those norms are established based on skateboarder’s collective
experience. In that experience, safety gear does little to prevent most injuries. For this
reason the requirement of safety gear is viewed as an illegitimate imposition on skaters.
Because there is no legitimate basis for the law, skaters do not respect or accept the law.
Skaters choose to risk the chance of a ticket rather than conform to its requirements. Or
they simply don’t use the skateparks where safety gear is enforced, choosing to skate in
the streets instead, which is what caused the problem in the first.
Had the law never been renewed, there would be no state mandate requiring cities
to adopt safety gear ordinances. Cities that wished to pass such an ordinance could do so,
and some undoubtedly would. But some would not, as demonstrated by the fact that
some cities do not enforce the safety gear ordinance in place. Skateboarding would be
one step further away from being criminalized. Additionally, without §115800, the
common law would control. This is the ideal scenario, as the common law primary
assumption of risk doctrine provides the individual skater with the autonomy to decide
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when and where to use safety gear, while giving cities greater protection against liability
for skateboard injuries then §115800.
III. Common Law Assumption of Risk Doctrine
A general rule of tort law is that each person has a duty to use ordinary care and
“is liable for injuries caused by his [or her] failure to exercise reasonable care in the
circumstances….” Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal.Rptr.97. This duty of care may be limited by the assumption of risk doctrine. The
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496A defines the doctrine as follows: “A plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm.” The Comments to the Restatement identifies
four contexts in which courts use assumption or risk. Relevant here is Comment c(2),
which states that the assumption of risk applies when the plaintiff has voluntarily entered
into some activity that she knows to involve some risk, and thereby has impliedly agreed
to take her own chances and to relieve the defendant of any duty.
The California Supreme Court discussed the assumption of risk doctrine at length
in Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296. Knight arose out of an informal touch football game
between social acquaintances. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 300. After a few minutes of play,
defendant ran into plaintiff. Plaintiff warned the defendant that he was playing too rough.
Id. at 300. On the very next play defendant collided with plaintiff, knocking her over and
stepping on her hand. Id. at 300. Plaintiff suffered an injury, and after three unsuccessful
operations, was forced to amputate her hand. Id. at 301. Plaintiff sued on a theory of
negligence. Id. at 301. Defendant asserted that the implied assumption of risk doctrine
barred plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 301.
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There was a question in California as to whether the doctrine was good law at the
time Knight was decided. The California Supreme Court had adopted a comparative fault
system in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P2d 1226, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858. Unlike
contributory fault systems, a comparative fault system allows plaintiffs to recover even if
the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the injury, although recovery is decreased to
that extent. Scott Giesler, The Uncertain Future of Assumption of Risk in California, 28
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1495 (1995). Many commentators and courts believed that the shift to
contributory fault negated the implied assumption of risk doctrine. Giesler, Id.
Knight clarified the role of the assumption of risk doctrine in light of the shift to a
comparative fault system by distinguishing between primary assumption of risk and
secondary assumption of risk. The court defined primary assumption of risk as “those
instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there
is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 308.
The court defined secondary assumption of risk, or implied assumption of risk, as
“instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff
knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty.” Id.
at 308. Secondary assumption of risk merges with the comparative fault scheme. Id. at
315. The primary assumption of risk remains a complete bar to plaintiff’s recovery. Id.
at 315. Whether primary or secondary assumption of risk applies is an objective inquiry;
the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff is irrelevant. Id. at 313. Instead the analysis
focuses on the inherent nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to that activity.
Id. at 313. As Knight recognized, danger, risk, and careless behavior are inherent in the
nature of many active sports. Id. at 316. The court recognized the policy interest in
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keeping litigation concerns from chilling participation in sport. Id. at 318. In order to
give effect to this policy, the court reasoned that defendants have no legal duty to
eliminate or decrease risks inherent in the sport. Id. at 316. The defendant’s duty is
limited to a duty not to increase the inherent risks of the sport. Id. at 316. The defendant
in Knight was found not to have increased the risks inherent to touch football, and the
court ruled that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the implied assumption of risk. Id. at 321.
Calhoon v. Lewis, 81 Cal.App.4th 108, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 (2000), held
skateboarding an inherently dangerous activity of the type contemplated by Knight.
Plaintiff, an experienced skateboarder, was practicing skateboard tricks in a driveway
owned by the parents of a friend. Calhoon, 81 Cal.App.4th at 111. Plaintiff suffered
serious injury when he fell backwards onto a planter and impaled himself on a hidden
pole that stuck out of the planter. Id. at 111. Plaintiff sued his friend’s parents, who had
placed the planter in the driveway. Id. at 111. Defendant moved for summary judgment,
arguing that skateboarding was an activity covered by the primary assumption of risk
doctrine. The trial court granted summary judgment and the Fourth District affirmed.
An activity falls within the doctrine if ‘the activity
is done for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as
well as elements of skill, and involves a challenge
containing a potential risk of injury.’ (Citation omitted).
These factors certainly apply to skateboarding.
Id. at 116.
The court dismissed plaintiff’s argument that their case fell within the exception
to the assumption of risk doctrine. That exception states that defendants “do have a duty
to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in
the sport.” Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 316. Plaintiff argued that defendants breached this duty by
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concealing a metal pipe in the planter, thereby increasing the risks inherent in
skateboarding. The court disagreed because the metal pipe did not cause plaintiff’s fall;
the risk of falling is inherent to skateboarding. Calhoon, 81 Cal.App.4th at 116. The
metal pipe increased the severity of the injury suffered, but the court explained that this
was irrelevant to the assumption of risk doctrine. Id. at 116. The exception applies when
defendant’s conduct increases the risk of injury beyond that inherent in the sport, not
when it increases the severity of the injury suffered. Id. at 116.
Together, Knight and Calhoon provide broad common law protection against
liability for skateboard injuries. Calhoon explicitly states that the primary assumption of
risk applies to skateboarding. In order to prevail, a plaintiff would have to show that a
city increased the risks of skateboarding above and beyond those inherent in the sport. In
other sports, plaintiffs have met this burden by showing that the defendant acted in a way
that violated the rules of the game and the norms of the sport. In skateboarding, there
literally are no rules of the game, thus, no way to violate them.
A plaintiff could try to show that the obstacles found in a skatepark increased the
risk inherent in the sport, but the primary assumption of risk would bar this argument.
The obstacles found in a skatepark are analogous to the obstacles found on a ski run.
And the Knight court indicated that such obstacles do not increase the risks inherent in
the sport. “Thus, although moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might
not exist were these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed by the moguls
are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate them.” Knight, 3
Cal.4th at 315. Like skiing, use of obstacles in skateparks is an inherent part of the sport,
and adds to the thrill.
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In addition to providing broad protection from liability, the primary assumption of
risk doctrine also preserves the autonomy of the sport. Defendants have a duty not to
increase the risks of the sport, but as Calhoon demonstrates, there is no duty to minimize
the severity of injury resulting from the risks. Under the common law a city might have
the duty to ensure that a skatepark is well built and maintained so as to not cause skaters
to fall. But it has no duty to minimize the severity of the fall by enforcing the use of
safety gear. In passing into law Health & Safety Code §115800 the legislature may have
imposed such a duty on cities, and in doing so, opened a door for plaintiffs that was
closed under the common law.
IV. The Effect of Statutory Law on The Assumption of Risk Doctrine.
§115800 imposes a duty on cities and public employees not found at common
law. This additional duty is the duty to enforce the wearing of kneepads, elbow pads and
a helmet by skateboarders in the skatepark. No operator of a skateboard park shall permit
any person to ride a skateboard therein, unless that person is wearing a helmet, elbow
pads, and knee pads. §115800(a). If the skatepark is not supervised on a regular basis,
the city may meet its duty by adopting an ordinance requiring any person riding a
skateboard at the facility to wear a helmet, elbow pads, and knee pads and by posting a
sign giving notice of the ordinance. §115800(b)(1)(2).
The city could fail to meet its duty under §115800 in a number of ways. If an
operator of a skatepark fails to enforce the pad requirement, he or she would have not
lived up to their statutory duty. If a city fails to adopt an ordinance requiring pads at the
skatepark, or fails to post sufficient signs giving notice of that ordinance, the city would
violate its statutory duty. The city may also violate its statutory duty if it fails to enforce
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the ordinance. It should be noted that such failures are common. In Northern California,
local pad ordinances are enforced at roughly half of the skateparks. In Southern
California public employees are often hired as skatepark operators. Helmet use is usually
enforced at these skateparks, but use of kneepads and elbow pads is rarely enforced.6 If
an injury results in such a scenario, the city would not only be precluded from invoking
the statutory protection of §115800, it may be barred from a defense based on the
assumption of risk doctrine. Whether it is in fact so barred is an open question in
California.
California Evidence Code § 669(a) is the codification of the common law rule
presuming a breach of the duty of care when a person violates a rule of law, and an injury
results. In California there is conflicting case law as to the effect that this presumption
has on the assumption of risk defense. The California Supreme Court attempted without
success to clarify this issue in Cheong v. Antablin, 16 Cal.4th 1063, 946 P.2d 817, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 859 (1997).
Cheong involved a collision between two skiers. Cheong, 16 Cal.4th at 1066.
Plaintiff sued for general negligence. Id. at 1066. The trial court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the
assumption of risk doctrine because a collision is an inherent risk of downhill skiing. Id.
at 1066. Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff pointed to a local ordinance that placed a duty on
skiers “to ski in a safe and reasonable manner.” Id. at 1067. Plaintiff argued that
defendant had violated this ordinance when he caused the collision. Plaintiff argued that
Evidence Code § 669 transformed the ordinance “into a legal duty of care, thus
6

These conclusions are based on a sample of skateboard parks throughout California
made in conjunction with work done by the author for Concussion Magazine.
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abrogating the assumption of the risk defense.” Id. at 1070. The Supreme Court “granted
plaintiff’s petition to review the issue of the ordinance’s effect.” But the court never
resolved the issue. Four separate concurring opinions were written, and the case was
dismissed on the narrowest of grounds. The court decided that plaintiff had not proven
that he was of the class that the ordinance was designed to protect -- a necessary element
of § 669.
Justice Chin wrote both the majority opinion and a concurring opinion in Cheong
in order to emphasize his view that a statutory violation does not abrogate the assumption
of risk. Id. at 1078. Justice Chin’s concurring opinion reasoned that a statutory violation
that triggers Evidence Code §669 creates a presumption of negligence per se. It does not
create an independent cause of action for negligence. Id. at 1078. Nor does it establish a
presumption of gross negligence. Under Knight, gross negligence is necessary to
maintain the suit; mere negligence is insufficient, and §669 does not affect the
assumption of risk doctrine. Id. at 1079.
Justice Chin’s opinions have yet to crystallize into law, and no clear rule has
emerged since Cheong. Given the California Supreme Court’s own indecisiveness as to
the effect of a statute or ordinance on the primary assumption of risk, it is not surprising
that lower courts have similarly struggled.
Distefano v. Forester, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (2001), found
that ordinances of the California Vehicle Code had no effect on the duty of the
participants engaged in the sport of off-roading. Both plaintiff and defendant were
engaged in the sport of off-roading on an unnamed dirt road in the desert. Distefano, 85
Cal. App. 4th at 1250. Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle up a steep hill and had nearly
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reached the top when he collided with defendant who had launched his dune buggy off
the other side of the hill. Id. at 1253. Plaintiff suffered serious injury as a result and sued
defendant for negligence. Id. at 1253.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that collisions are a risk
inherent to the sport of off-roading. Id. at 1253. Plaintiff argued that defendant had
increased the inherent risk of collisions and had violated the statutory duty of care as set
forth in California Vehicle Code §§38305 and 38316. Id. at 1256. §38305 proscribes the
driving of off-highway motor vehicles at a speed that is greater than is reasonable or
prudent. §38361 proscribes the driving of off-highway motor vehicles with a willful and
wanton disregard for the safety of other persons or property. Plaintiff argued that these
statutes determined the duty of care owed by defendant, that defendant had violated these
statutes, that this violation along with Evidence Code §669 negated the primary
assumption of risk doctrine. The trial court disagreed. In determining the duty of care,
the court looked to the sport itself, which it found could “readily be characterized by the
phrase: ‘Thrills, chills, and spills.’” Id. at 1258. The trial court applied the primary
assumption of risk doctrine and granted summary judgment. Id. at 1258.
The Fourth Appellate District affirmed, reasoning that the statutory violations did
not affect the primary assumption of risk defense. The court found that the defendant’s
conduct did not violate the statute, but that even if it had, the statutes “did not establish an
independent duty, the breach of which would expose Forester to tort liability….” Id. at
1274. The court recognized that the legislature can abrogate the assumption of risk
doctrine, but the statutes in question demonstrated no clear intent to do so. Id. at 1273.
Further, the court found that a violation of a statute should not trigger the presumption
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created by Evidence Code §669. Id. at 1273. In so finding, the court expressly adopted
the reasoning of Justice Chin’s concurring opinion in Cheong. Id. at 1263. Finally,
applying the Knight test, the court found that defendant’s conduct was not “so reckless as
to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.” Id. at 1254.
Campbell v. Derylo 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519 (1999), looked to a
relevant ordinance to determine if the defendant had increased the dangers inherent in the
sport. Plaintiff was an eleven-year-old skier who stopped to rest on the slope. Campbell,
75 Cal. App. 4th at 825. Defendant was a seventeen-year-old snowboarder who had
stopped to rest further up on the slope. Id at 825. Defendant removed his feet from the
bindings, and the snowboard slid out of his control and down the slope, hitting plaintiff in
the lower back. Defendant did not have a retention strap on his snowboard, even though
one is required by an El Dorado County ordinance. Id at 825. Plaintiff sued, claiming
that defendant had increased the risks above those inherent in the sport. Id at 828-29.
The defendant asserted the assumption of risk defense, stating that runaway snowboards
and skis are an inherent risk of the sport of skiing. The trial court held for defendant. Id
at 826.
On appeal, the Third Appellate District reversed and remanded, holding that the
ordinance could determine the standard of care required of snowboarders. “A jury could
find that, by using a snowboard without the retention strap, in violation of… a county
ordinance, defendant unnecessarily increased the danger [of the sport].” Id at 829.
Although the court specifically declined to address the combined effect of Evidence Code
§ 669 and the county ordinance on the primary assumption of risk doctrine, the decision
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makes clear that the county ordinance could determine the duty of care required of the
defendant. Id at 829.
Campbell demonstrates how courts can circumvent Justice Chin’s argument that a
statutory violation has no effect on the assumption of risk. Under Knight, defendants have
a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport. Conduct that does so is gross
negligence, not protected by the assumption of risk. Campbell found that the ordinance
defined the level of risk inherent in the sport, and defendant’s violation of that ordinance
showed that he had violated his duty not to increase the sport’s risks. The violation of the
ordinance amounted to gross negligence. Justice Chin’s argument that a statutory
violation leads to a cause of action based on mere negligence, barred under Knight, is
undercut when the court has already determined that the violating conduct demonstrates
gross negligence.
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Liability limiting statutes such as § 115800 are especially prone to a Campbell
type of interpretation. The ordinance in Campbell required use of a restraining strap on a
snowboard. § 115800 requires use of safety gear in skateparks. As in Campbell, a court
could find that § 115800 defines the risks inherent in the sport. As in Campbell, a court
could find that by not enforcing the requirement of safety gear the city breached their
duty not to increase the risks of skateboarding. Of course, the plaintiff would also bear
some of the responsibility for their injury, as they were the party who ultimately decided
not to wear safety gear. But in California where there is a comparative fault scheme, the
plaintiff might still recover some portion of damages. As long as this possibility remains,
the incentive to litigate remains.
V. Conclusion
Incentives to litigate sports injuries need to be removed if “high-risk” sports like
skateboarding are to survive and thrive. A few plaintiffs should not be allowed to shut
down skateparks. This is not to suggest that plaintiffs should be totally barred from
recovery. Cities should have a minimal duty of care. For example, a plaintiff should be
able to recover for injuries caused by dilapidated ramps, etc. The city should have a duty
not to increase the risks of skating by allowing skateparks to fall into disrepair. Forcing
cities to live up to such a minimal duty would not introduce such liability concerns as to
fundamentally alter the nature of the sport. Imposing a duty on cities to force skaters to
wear safety gear does. The fact that skaters consistently disobey the law demonstrates
this point.
The legislature does have power to alter the nature of sports, but it should not do
so absent a legitimate concern over safety. A policy favoring the individual’s autonomy
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and risk choice so dictates. Skateboarding’s safety record demonstrates that there is no
such legitimate concern. The legislature adopted §115800 without any reference to
statistical facts about skateboarding and safety. The legislative history is void of such a
discussion. Instead the legislature proceeded on the same presumptions about
skateboarding that have constantly threatened its survival – namely that it is an unsafe
sport. The common law makes no such assumptions.
The common law assumption of risk doctrine allows the individual and the sport
to determine the type and degree of risks inherent to the sport. It continues to develop in
a manner that protects the autonomy of the individual and his or her choice to participate
in sports. The stabilizing effects of this trend should be encouraged. Legislatures in
other states should refrain from adopting liability-limiting statutes such as §115800. If
such statutes are deemed necessary, they should be drafted in a manner such that courts
are unable to interpret them as creating a duty of care not present under the common law.
This would require the legislature to respect the sport, and respect the choices of the
individual participant, something already done in the common law.
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